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Condominiums and the Corporate
Securities Law
By B. L. HOISINGTON*

UP to this time there

has been no certain resolution either by the
courts or the legislature of the question of whether or not a condominium
interest is subject to the Corporate Securities Law. Nevertheless, thousands upon thousands of dollars are being invested in condominium
developments by persons and institutions in the face of this uncertainty
which could radically affect the organization and methods of sale and
resale of such interests. The courts and the legislature will inevitably
be drawn into this picture to resolve the conflicts. This article hopes to
highlight the problems involved in such a resolution by reviewing
and attempting to rationalize the relevant statutory provisions and
certain of the cases construing them.'
The nature of condominium ownership has been described at some
length in other articles appearing in this volume and in other contemporary publications. It will be assumed, therefore, that the reader
possesses an understanding of what condominiums are and how they
work.
An Introduction to the Problem
The starting point of analysis must be the statute itself. The California Corporate Securities Law defines a security in very broad
terms :2

"Security" includes all of the following: (a) Any stock ... any certificate of interest or participation; any certificate in a profit-sharing
agreement; any certificate of interest in an oil, gas, or mining title
or lease; any transferable share, investment contract, or beneficial
interest in title to property, profits, or earnings....
* Member, State Bar of California; L.L.B., Hastings College of Law (1960). Assisted by
Vernon A. Harris, second year student.
1 The cases considering the application of the Corporate Securities Law to "unusual"
types of interests are collected in numerous places, and this article will discuss only those
principal decisions which seem to bear most closely on the condominium question. See
BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS, § 347 et seq. (4th ed. 1962), for
leads into the cases generally.
'CAL. CORP. CODE § 25008.
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There are several specific exemptions, among them:
Any bona fide joint
adventure interest, except such interests when
3
offered to the public.
Any security (except notes, bonds, debentures, or other evidences
of indebtedness, whether interest-bearing or not) issued by a company
organized under the laws of this State exclusively for educational,
benevolent, fraternal, charitable, or reformatory purposes and not for
pecuniary profit, no part of the earnings of
which inures to the benefit
4
of any private shareholder or individual.
Bills of exchange, trade acceptances, promissory notes and any
guarantee thereof, and other commercial paper issued, given, or
acquired in a bona fide way in the ordinary course of legitimate business, trade, or commerce. 5
In 1948 the attorney general considered the applicability of the
Corporate Securities Law to an arrangement in which six couples each
puchased an undivided one-sixth interest as tenants in common in an
apartment building.' Each couple was designated "owner" of a particular apartment in the building. It was suggested that each of these
interests was a "beneficial interest in title to property" and accordingly
were securities. The attorney general said:'
We note, however, that conveyances of real property to purchasers
as tenants in common have always been held an acceptable form of
realty transaction. In the normal case no one has ever considered that
a security in such cases was issued within the meaning of the Corporate
Securities Act. ...
However, the schemes in question vary from the ordinary tenancy in
common realty transactions. Normally a seller selling real property
merely offers the property for sale at a price. He is not interested
whether the buyer is a single purchaser or whether several purchasers
combine to take tenancy in common fractional interests. In the instant
case the seller is offering to the public fractional interests in the whole
property to separate purchasers. This in a sense is offering for sale
a "beneficial interest in title to property."
The opinion quotes from the case of People v. Davenport' language
to the effect that the literal meaning of words in the Corporate Securities
Law does not operate to carry the enactment beyond the "general
purpose or scheme entertained by the Legislature in passing the statute . . .," and concludes as follows: 10
a CAL. CORP. CODE § 25100(m).
'CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(a).

CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(b) .
CAL. Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 81 (1948).
7Id. at 82.
' 13 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 91 P.2d 892 (1939).
11 CAL. Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 81, 82.
10 Id. at 83.
'
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One inherent difference, however, between the transaction in question and those at which the act is directed is that the purpose in selling
and in buying interests in the apartment is to sell to persons who buy
merely in order to secure a place to live. There is no element of
investment in the sense that buyers purchase an interest in the property
in the expectation or hope of securing capital gain or interest, the
latter being characteristics of a security transaction under the act.

This attorney general's opinion highlights many of the critical considerations involved in determining the applicability of the Corporate
Securities Law to condominiums, and the following questions, raised
in the opinion, will recur repeatedly, in one form or another, in the
analysis which follows:
1. What is the "general purpose" or "scheme" of the Corporate
Securities Law?
2. Is the expectation of "capital gain" or "interest" an essential
element of every "security transaction"?
3. Is any fractional interest in real property a "beneficial interest
in title to property" within the meaning of the Corporate Securities Law?
4. What is the legal effect of the "home purchase" motive on the
classification of an interest as a security?
Understanding the Purpose of the California Law
Unlike the federal securities act and the securities laws of most
other states, the California Corporate Securities Law is aimed at more
than the mere protection of investors against sales fraud. 1 The required
administrative review is undertaken for the purpose of determining
whether the proposed plan of business as well as the proposed issuance
of securities is "fair, just, and equitable."'" Thus, in a sense, the California Law undertakes to regulate the organization and structure of
certain businesses as well as the representations and circumstances of
the sale of interests therein. Not merely "the risks of the sale" but also
"the risks of the business relationship" created by the sale are regulated.
An awareness of this broadened purpose of the California Corporate
Securities Law can be helpful in determining whether any particular
type of interest is subject to that law. However, a peculiar fallacy of
reasoning often creeps into analyses of the law at this point. There is
a noticeable tendency among many persons faced with these problems
to confuse the standard of review with the standard of definition.
Obviously, a particular corporate structure may be eminently fair, just,
"' In re Leach, 215 Cal. 536, 12 P.2d 3 (1932) ; Geisenhoff v. Mabrey, 58 Cal. App. 2d
481, 137 P.2d 36 (1943) ; Moore v. Stella, 52 Cal. App. 2d 766, 127 P.2d 300 (1942).
12 CAL. CoRnP. CODE § 25507.
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and equitable and yet remain subject to this law; while, in contrast,
a particular joint venture may be most speculative, unfair and inequitable to certain participants in it and yet, so long as such interests
are not offered to the public, remain outside the scope of the securities
law. "Fairness" and "justice" may be a part of the standard of review,
but they are not a part of the standard of definition.
How, then, does the broadened purpose of the law mentioned above
assist in formulating a definition of a security? It does so by pointing
out where to look for the definitive characteristics of a security; namely,
at the kind of business relationshipscreated between the parties and the
character of the risks created by that relationship. Since the purpose
of a regulatory law such as the Corporate Securities Law is to protect
against risks and not to discourage certain types of business relationships, where it is clear that the risks sought to be protected against are
absent from a particular business relationship, there would be no
"purpose" in regulating the terms of that relationship. This is, or
should be, the case regardless of the labels which have been, though
usually for wholly different reasons, attached to the relationship. The
well-worn principle of "looking through form to substance" is really
only another way of saying that the definitive characteristics of an
activity are found in the "risks" and "relationships" involved and not
in the "names" or "labels" associated with it.
It has been suggested in some quarters that since the concern of this
law is risks, any analysis of it should focus primarily on the risks
inherent in an activity rather than on the kind of relationship involved
in the activity. This approach has two disadvantages. First, there is
the ever present danger of confusing the concept of a particular kind
of risk with the element of "riskiness" involved in a particular activity
(which is a variety of the fallacy of confusing the standard of review
with the standard of definition, mentioned above). And secondly, as
a practical matter it is very difficult to characterize a risk by separately
setting out its definitive characteristics apart from the practical, human
situation in which it arises. This latter difficulty, while seldom if ever
expressly acknowledged, is a basic problem throughout the field of
regulatory law. In response to this problem, regulatory laws have been
organized or arranged around "relationships" rather than risks. For
example, where the risk is that of "cheating by misrepresentation,"
the Real Estate Law has been designed to approach the problem in
the setting of real estate sales relationships while the Installment Sales
Law approaches the same risk in a totally different relationship-setting.
With certain risks that are considered extreme, the Penal Law attacks
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the risk directly and as such (viz., fraud), but regulatory laws customarily do not.
The Corporate Securities Law, then, purposes to protect persons

against certain risks arising out of certain specialized types of relationships-not all relationships. Accordingly, the question of this law's
application to condominium interests is one of determining whether
any of the relationships created by the sale of condominium interests
are the kind of relationship which the legislature intended to regulate
under that law.
Some Established Security Relationships
The shareholder-corporation relationship is probably the clearest
example of the kind intended to be regulated by the securities law.
Its typical characteristics are: (1) the investment of capital (2) with
the expectation of monetary gain (3) in return for a fractional interest
(4) in a profit-seeking enterprise (5) which usually is to be managed
by others.
'While these characteristics are denoted "typical," it must be recognized that not all non-profit corporations are exempt from the law.
In such non-profit corporations where the shareholder does not expect
monetary return, he nevertheless maintains an interest in an enterprise
which he expects to see operated in a fashion which will result in some
sort of continuing benefit to him. For this interest he supplies, in most
cases, a portion of the capital with which the enterprise is to operate.
Where the shareholder neither supplies risk capital nor invests for
profit, there is good reason to argue that the Corporate Securities Law
should have no application even though a corporate form of organization is employed by the enterprise. It surely should have no application where the corporate form is not employed.
The document which evidences the shareholder-corporation relationship is called "stock." While stock is literally defined as a "security,"
it is not the label attached to the document evidencing the relationship
which is sought to be regulated but rather the relationship itself.
Therefore, in determining the law's "purpose," the emphasis must be
on the relationship and not the document. It is not really very important
whether one arrives at this conclusion by saying that while the document
is labeled "stock" and looks like stock it is not really stock, or by saying
that not all "stock" is subject to regulation, so long as one recognizes
what is being used as the basis of definition.
Where the relationship is such that the investor actively participates
in a non-corporate business venture in order to create the profit in which
he is to share, the courts have declined to find the Corporate Securities
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Law applicable.' 3 In People v. Syde' 4 the court said: "The expectation
of financial return . . . might have been raised by hopes falsely
induced. But since the agreement contemplates actual participation
. . . it cannot be considered as a security within the meaning of the
statute: and neither numbers of participants nor possible fraud in its
creation may transmute the instrument into a security which in legal
effect it is not."
Where the relationship is such that the investor is not to participate
actively in the enterprise and someone else is to manage the property
from which the investor is to realize a profit, the courts may hold the
Corporate Securities Law applicable even though the investor may be
the outright owner of the property involved." Thus, in Hollywood
State Bank v. Wilde,"6 defendant sold chinchillas by the pair with the
agreement that he would be permitted to raise, care for, breed and
ultimately sell the animals on the purchaser's behalf. The court had
little difficulty in finding a security transaction. In Domestic & Foreign
Petroleum Co. v. Long' there were sales of undivided interests in oil
leaseholds. In holding such interests subject to the securities law, the
court emphasized that the purchasers (grantees) were not to have any
voice concerning the operations. They were investors who were buying
nothing more than a right to share in profits produced by others. This
element of "passivity" on the part of the investor is one of the most
firmly established characteristics of a "security relationship.' 8
In the recent case of Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 9 members
of the public were asked to invest money with a developer who proposed
to build a country club for the enjoyment of those who invested in it.
The prospective members were given no ownership in the club, no
"People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951) ; People v. Gould, 37 Cal. 2d 885,
235 P.2d 604 (1951) ; Maguire v. Lees, 74 Cal. App. 2d 697, 169 P.2d 411 (1946) ; People
v. Anderson, 35 Cal. App. 2d 23, 94 P.2d 627 (1939) ; People v. Steele, 2 Cal. App. 2d 370,
36 P.2d 40 (1934).
14 37 Cal. 2d 765 at 769, 235 P.2d 601 at 603; cf. People v. Staver, 115 Cal. App. 2d 711,
252 P.2d 700 (1953).
lC Oil Lease Service, Inc. v. Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 2d 100, 327 P.2d 628 (1958);
Hollywood State Bank v. Wilde, 70 Cal. App. 2d 103, 160 P.2d 846 (1945) ; Gracchi v.
Friedlander, 93 Cal. App. 770, 270 Pac. 235 (1928) ; see cases cited inlra note 18.
'Ibid.
"4 Cal. 2d 547, 51 P.2d 73 (1935).
"See note 14 supra; cf. People v. Miller, 192 Cal. App. 2d 414, 13 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961);
People v. Rankin, 160 Cal. App. 2d 93, 325 P.2d 10 (1958) ; Goldberg v. Paramount Oil
Company, 143 Cal. App. 2d 215, 300 P.2d 329 (1956) ; People v. Hoshor, 92 Cal. App. 2d 250,
206 P.2d 882 (1949) ; People v. Woodson, 78 Cal. App. 2d 132, 177 P.2d 586 (1947) ; Moore
v. Stella, 52 Cal. App. 2d 766, 127 P.2d 300 (1942) ; see also People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal.
App. 41, 24 P.2d 965 (1933).
1955 Cal. 2d 811, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 361 P.2d 906 (1961).
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participation in its construction or subsequent operation, and no promise
of profit. The California Supreme Court declared the promotion to be
subject to the Corporate Securities Law. This case has wide implications
for the future direction of the California Corporate Securities Law.
But its effect can be over-emphasized. The case involved the solicitation
of funds from many members of the public to promote the future
construction of an enterprise in which the public investors were to
have purely beneficial interests. The public investors were not to
participate in any way in the expenditure of their funds but were
"gambling" that the promoter would keep his word and construct the
facilities which the investors expected to enjoy.
One can see that the "labels" involved in the cases construing the
Corporate Securities Law have run the gamut from animal husbandry
agreements, through mineral leases, mortgage notes2" and contracts for
the sale of the right to a chemical process,21 to agreements for memberships in an unbuilt country club. It is fair to conclude that when the
California courts are confronted with the question of whether or not
a condominium interest is subject to the Corporate Securities Law little
moment will be given the fact that these are "home purchases" of
"tenancy in common" and "fee simple" interests in "real estate" in the
form of "apartments" conveyed by "deeds" if the courts are otherwise
satisfied that a security relationship is present.
A Comparison of Condominium Relationships
Developer-Purchaser
The first obvious relationship involved in condominium ownership
is that between the developer and the unit purchaser. Where the
developer approaches the purchaser before the condominium apartment
house is built and receives an investment of capital from the purchaser
in exchange for the developer's promise to build and deliver, the rela.
tionship is quite similar to that involved in Silver Hills and in many
respects the benefits expected from the investment are much more
substantial. However, if such subscriptions were held subject to the
securities law, the position of certain contractual relationships regarding
the construction of homes in subdivisions would have to be distinguished. In conventional subdivision development single family dwellings, each to be wholly owned by its occupant, are sometimes purchased
in advance under a contract for construction and delivery. From the
standpoint of the risks involved there are many similarities between
such relationships and those in a pre-construction condominium sale.
2o In re Leach, 215 Cal. 536, 12 P.2d 3 (1932).
1
People v. Gregory, 12 Cal. App. 2d 7, 54 P.2d 770 (1936).
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The critical distinction may be simply that the home-construction contract of sale is regulated under the Real Estate Law and, regardless
of the similarity of risks, the Corporate Securities Law is not intended
to overlap in such basic and typical real estate transactions. Whether
this reasoning of implied exclusion should be extended to a preconstruction solicitation of capital for a condominium apartment house
is not at all clear. The similarities to Silver Hills are very strong where
the purchase money is solicited in advance of construction, and a condominium is not a simple, typical and common real estate transaction.22
Where the apartment house is fully constructed and the developer
fully performs his promises to the unit-purchaser upon delivery of
the deed, there has ceased to be any risk-relationship between the
developer and the purchaser at all. Hence, one would not expect that
relationship to be the subject of "securities" regulation.
Where the apartment house is constructed, but the developer has
promised to complete additional projects or perform additional acts
benefiting the purchaser after the sale (as, perhaps, paying assessments
due from unsold units, endeavoring to sell the remainder of the units
on similar terms, or constructing a swimming pool) the application of
securities regulation is more uncertain. The answer should revolve
around whether the purchaser has supplied the developer capital which
the developer is to utilize in a promised manner in order for the
purchaser to realize whatever benefit has been expected by him. In most
situations it would appear doubtful that this developer-purchaser relationship would properly be characterized as a "security relationship"
where the developer has merely promised incidentally to do something
in the future. However, if that "something" amounted to a promised
"swimming pool" for which others were contributing similar funds,
the similarities with the Silver Hills situation become more prominent.2"
The Relationship of the Property Owners Inter se
Adjoining land owners have a relationship which is well defined
in the law of real property.2 4 It usually bears little resemblance to
that of security holders. The rights, powers and privileges which inure
to the benefit of land owners come to them not through the fulfillment
22 As a practical matter it would be extremely difficult to finance construction of a

condominium apartment project with funds solicited in advance from prospective purchasers.
See Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11013.1-11013.5.
3 Note again the practical effect of §§ 11013.1-11013.5 supra note 22, and the operation
of such provisions of the Real Estate Law as an implied exclusion from the Corporate
Securities Law.
" A notable exception to this statement is the ever growing number of subdivisions or
"localities" which are sold subject to a vast number of recorded restrictions, some of which
go very far in subjecting the manner of enjoyment of the individual home to decisions of a
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of another's promise, which is typically the case with securities, but
through the legally enforceable incidents of property ownership. The
benefits which land owners expect to realize from their investments
are to result from their own efforts and activities in the exercise of their
established property rights. This is probably why individual home
owners in subdivisions are never thought to be subject to securities
regulation. Condominium owners are, at least in so far as their fee
ownership is concerned, "land owners," and it is difficult to imagine
their being subject to the Corporate Securities Law on this account.
The tenancy in common aspect of condominium ownership is closer
to the line, however. The so-called "common elements" make up the
tangible assets of a condominium arrangement. These elements are
owned in common by all unit-purchasers without the right of severance.
In the language of the shareholder-corporation relationship, there has
been an investment of capital in exchange for a fractional interest in
an enterprise to be operated by others, i.e., the management board. 5
Important elements of the typical security relationship are missing,
however. There is no expectation of monetary gain present in the
purchase of a condominium interest except in the sense in which any
home owner expects his home to appreciate in value.2 6 But, as has
been said earlier, many non-profit corporations are held subject to the
Corporate Securities Law. And, in the non-corporate setting the element
of monetary profit or gain has not been held essential where there is an
element of "risk capital" involvedY In many non-corporate securities
transactions the investor is promised a right or privilege which he could
not exercise so as to realize his expected benefit without the promoter's
future performance. This is probably the most important distinctive
feature of condominium ownership. The unit-owner, in so far as his
tenancy in common interest is concerned (and apart from the effect of
the management contract on the situation) has from the very outset all
"local" property owners association. While these groups, so long as they are unincorporated,
have never been thought of as being subject to the Corporate Securities Law, the riskrelationship between the parties is quite similar to that of condominium owners under the
management agreement and are, in many respects, perhaps as deserving of regulation.
"It may be argued that the operation by the management board is really a species of
self-operation, but in many proposed condominium setups the relationship of the individual
owner to the managing board is, at least in so far as risks are concerned, similar to that of
a shareholder and the corporate board of directors. See the discussion infra.
" This excludes the possibility that some owners will purchase condominium interests
not for occupancy but speculating on a future resale at a profit. This possibility should not
affect the classification of the interest for purposes of the Corporate Securities Law. Many
parcels of real estate are purchased on speculation, as are items of personal property, without
thereby transforming them into "securities."
"'Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 361 P.2d 906
(1961) ; see Note, 14 HAsTINGs L.J. 187 (1962).
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of the rights and privileges which he expects to receive from the
developer. Whether or not he realizes his expected benefits from his
tenancy in common condominium interest is a matter of his own, and
not someone else's, future performance. In this respect the relationship
of tenancy in common ownership bears only slightly more resemblance
to that of typical security holders than does the relationship of owners
in fee simple. Therefore, it would appear that, where the apartment
building is fully constructed and the developer has promised substantially no more than to deliver a good deed to real property, no typical
security relationship is created by the delivery (or promised delivery)
of that deed. There remains, however, an important additional feature
of condominium ownership which must be considered.
The Management Agreement
The precise relationship created between the unit-owners in a condominium under their management agreement is, of course, dependent
on its particular terms. In general, most proposed agreements provide
for a management board of limited powers and authority elected by
the unit-ownership and charged with the responsibility of collecting
monthly assessments, providing for common liabilities, and keeping
the apartment building and other "common elements" in good repair.
In so far as the duties of the board are fixed by the agreement and
their discretion limited, the whole arrangement would appear to constitute little more than the delegation of certain common responsibilities
by the individual owners to a committee of their choosing for their
mutual convenience. Where owners of single unit dwellings in more
conventional circumstances undertake to arrange their affairs in a
similar manner, seldom, if ever, does one hear the suggestion that the
Securities Law is applicable to their arrangements. But the condominium management contract is, or may be (depending upon how it is
written), substantially different from a simple arrangement of property
owners.
First, it is a "contract" which is offered as part of a "package
deal" to prospective purchasers before they become property owners.
It is not something they negotiate after their ownership is complete.2"
Secondly, the arrangement is vastly more complex.
Thirdly, the terms of the arrangement are, or may be (denending
upon the way the restrictions are written), extremely important to the
"sIf the promoter retains interests in the condominium, the non-negotiated, complex
nature of the deed and accompanying restrictions increases the risks of over-reaching in the
terms of sale. However important these increased risks are, as such, they should not affect
the interest's classification, unless the promoter were to retain in some manner substantial
control of the management board.
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realization of the benefits and enjoyments which the condominium
owner expects to receive from his ownership. If the management board
is given, for example, broad discretion to establish common rules and
regulations governing the manner in which the unit-owner may "live"
(e.g., hours for entertaining guests, the presence and number of guests,
the rental of units, pets, colors of furnishings, the use of common
recreational facilities, noises, washing facilities, etc.), a point may be
reached where the realization of the expected benefits is derived more
from the activities and decisions of the management board than from
the activities of the individual unit-owner. When this point is reached
the similarities between the shareholder-management relationship in a
corporate organization and the owner-management relationship of a
condominium are very great.
These distinctions are admittedly matters of "degree," but so are
most difficult distinctions. A simple arrangement of single family unitowners for the cooperative management of certain matters incidentally
beneficial to the enjoyment of their property may well not be properly
classified as a security, while a complex arrangement of tenants in
common for the cooperative management of the physical premises of
their "homes," which management is absolutely determinative of the
nature and existence of their beneficial enjoyment of their individual
and common property, might well be properly classified as a security.
It is obvious that, at the extremes, matters of degree become differences
of kind.
Nevertheless, there are important differences between the condominium owner-management relationship and that of the shareholdercorporation relationship. Condominium owners live with the organization. They are in day to day contact with the operation. Their information, or a large part of it, does not come through complicated financial
statements or reports but through "first hand" observation. Moreover,
the board of directors of a corporation has an "open-ended" discretion
to cause the corporation to buy, sell, invest and pursue any endeavor
or venture it sees fit within its business judgment. The management
board of a condominium is a limited agent of the joint owners,
empowered only with such prerogatives as are expressly given in the
recorded restrictions. The board is quite limited in its functions and
capacities to "risk" the security of the common elements. These are
important distinctions in terms of both the risk to which the interestowners are subjected at the hands of management and the kind of
relationship which exists between owner and management.
On balance then, there are important distinctions between the condominium management arrangement and the typical cooperative
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arrangement of local (single family unit) property owners, but there
are also important differences with the shareholder-corporation relationship and other typical securities relationships. The condominium is
obviously very accurately described as a "hybrid."
Some Conclusions
Most of the cases in other jurisdictions involving cooperative apartment transactions and securities regulation are distinguishable from
the California condominium situation for the reason either that public
investment was solicited in advance of construction,2 9 or that the particular securities law involved exempted real property sales expressly, 0
or that the corporate form of organization was employed. 3" Accordingly, they are of little assistance in determining the application of the
California Law to most of the proposed forms of condominium developments.
Most of the cases construing the California Law's application to noncorporate transactions involve an investment for profit by the public
purchaser. However, the clear implication of the language of the statute
is that it is not necessarily limited to investments for profit nor issues
of profit-making companies. The Silver Hills case has made it clear that
investment for profit is unnecessary at least where there is a solicitation
of risk capital from the public.
The purchase of a unit in a completed condominium apartment house
involves neither an investment for profit nor a supplying of risk capital
to a promotional venture. Except for the relationship created by the
management arrangement, the relationship created by the purchase
of a condominium interest is that of adjoining and joint landowners,
and there is little reason to believe the legislature intended to regulate
such relationships under the Corporate Securities Law.
There are, in general, at least two respects in which the relationship
under the management agreement is typically similar to that of security
holders; namely, (1) each owner participates in a manner similar to
that of shareholders in a corporation in the management of an organization from which each expects to derive a continuing benefit, and (2) each
owner purchases a fairly complex and non-negotiated bundle of rights

"oBrothers v. McMahon, 351 Ill. App. 321, 115 N.E.2d 116 (1953).
"oState v. Silberberg, 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956).
" State v. Hirsch, 101 Ohio App. Rep. 425, 131 N.E.2d 419 (1956). The court held no
security was involved, but the Ohio statute expressly excludes sales of real estate Compare
Sire Plan Portfolios v. Carpenter, 8 Il1. App. 2d 354, 132 N.E.2d 78 (1956).
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and duties
in an organization in which each owns only a fractional
2
interest.1
There are also two typical dissimilarities; namely, (1) the purchaser
neither invests for profit nor supplies risk capital to a profit-seeking
venture, and (2) the funds paid over, including the assessments paid
to management, are presumably (depending upon how the management
restrictions are drafted) given for a rather immediate quid pro quo
received by the purchaser either in the form of recognized property
rights or in the form of benefits for which the purchaser would otherwise
have had to pay on his own.
The purchase price of a condominium interest is paid for two
things: (1) an immediate bundle of property rights, and (2) a continuing future benefit or enjoyment to be derived from the proper
management of the common elements. Perhaps the feature of condominium purchase most similar to the risk capital element of the
typical security relationship is found in this second purchase object.
The distinctions with the Silver Hills case, at least where the condominium is fully constructed and the promoter or developer retains
no interest in the operation, are substantial. There is no risk of the
promoter's unsuccessful future performance. The structure or asset
which the purchaser expects to enjoy is present, existing and ready for
enjoyment. If there is "capital" "risked," it is risked in the continuing
management operation which is a sort of joint venture, and this is
much more analogous to the sale of memberships in an existing facility
than to the solicitation of capital for a future one (if the Silver Hills
analogy is to be followed). If the condominium interest were to be
held a security, it would appear to be simply because money is supplied
for an operation in which the supplier has a continuing beneficial,
fractional interest and which operation is managed by others in a
manner similar to the way in which a corporation is managed.
It can readily be seen that it is impossible to state flatly whether or
not a condominium interest is subject to securities regulation. Much may
depend upon the stage of development at which the interest is offered
and/or the terms of the instruments creating it. Nevertheless, the
question is one which should be resolved. It would be a fairly simple
matter for the legislature to resolve most of the doubts surrounding this
question. It would be more difficult for the courts to do so without
creating as many uncertainties as were resolved. But the present uncertainty has a decided depressive effect on the development of this new
" See Anderson, Cooperative Apartments in Florida,12 U. op MIAMi L. REv. 13, for a
view stressing this element of "complexity" as a basis for classification as a security.
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possibility for convenient urban living. There are, no doubt, some
who feel that such a depressant is practically valuable. It is not.
If securities regulation is needed it should be asserted clearly and
understandably so that matters may proceed in compliance with it.
If securities regulation is not needed, any unreasonably prolonged
period of uncertainty can only operate to raise unnecessarily the costs
of condominium ownership to future purchasers and to injure the market
generally.

